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So much has been said and written recently about the iden-
tification of a new set of objectives in legal education that it
seems time to take stock of some of the possible working diffi-
culties which may lie ahead along this new course we are map-
ping out for ourselves.
Professor Jones has, in his paper, incorporated the best that
has evolved in the deliberations of our Policy Committee (which
meets only in the pages of the law reviews), adding to previous
reports three points which will be accepted gratefully as substan-
tial contributions. I should like now to try to sketch out an
agenda for the Committee on Ways and Means.
Our consideration of the grubby details of our job can pro-
ceed from what would appear to be, if broad enough terms are
relied upon, substantial agreement about three things. The first
is that a substantial new content is to be added to the law school
course of study of ten years ago. This new content is variously
labelled as "processes," "skills," "values," "policy-making," "un-
derstanding," and "insights." Perhaps there are basic differences
suggested by these labels, or perhaps only shadings. For our
purposes it makes little difference. There is agreement that legal
education is not to be a one-dimensional offering of information-
al content, and that the bringing out of the second and/or the
third dimensions is going to require the inclusion of new matter
in the course of study. It is the fact that more is to be taught,
regardless of its precise nature, that poses problems of ways and
means which we may profitably consider.
Two broad decisions as to method have also been made, at
least to a degree warranting consideration of some of the smaller
details to which the Policy Committee has perhaps not given full
attention. One of these is that we can no longer accept the "case
method" as providing an exclusive formula for building teaching
books and preparing daily class presentations. The "problem
method" has been identified as an improved technique, at least
for certain courses, and other similar innovations have been rec-
ommended. There is also rather general agreement that student
participation in the learning process must be broadened. Read-
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ing, listening (to us) and talking (to us) is not enough. "Think-
ing" is not sufficient either, at least in its old sense. There must
be some degree of learning by seeing and by actual doing.
Accepting then the proposition that something more than in-
formation is now to be imparted by a new kind of student par-
ticipation in a new kind of intellectual activity, what are some
of the "bugs" which ought to be anticipated in moving this proj-
ect from the drafting to the operating stage? It will be enough,
today, if we try just to identify as many of these mechanical
problems as we can, making no complete attempt to resolve them.
It will be assumed that the first problems to be considered
are those which will arise in connection with the revision of the
law school curricula. Virtually all of the recent proposals for
a reorientation of the law schools' endeavors start from an iden-
tification of the lawyer's capacities and talents and then proceed
directly to a proposed reshuffling and refurbishment of the cur-
riculum.
Important as this matter of curricular content undoubtedly is,
it may not be entirely amiss to suggest that false emphasis upon
it may well prove to be one of the dangers in this renovation
process. There is a deceptive appearance of logic and good sense
in the thesis that a listing of the talents requisite to competent
legal practice constitutes also a listing of what should be included
in the law school curriculum.
The most obvious fallacy in such a thesis is of course its fail-
ure to take account of the impossibility of including in a three-
year course of study opportunities for the development of all legal
talents and capacities. Much of this job will have to be done in
the course of the student's pre-legal college training. Some of
the rest of it will have to be done during the period of his post-
law school interneship, either formal or informal in nature. To
whatever extent an attempt is made to compensate for the inade-
quacies in the average student's pre or post law school experi-
ence, there will be present the danger that those parts of the job
which the law school can do best will receive less attention than
ought to be given them.
There is a related possibility that the sudden realization of
lawyer-needs which have not previously been given due atten-
tion will result automatically in attempts to formulate special,
separate courses to satisfy those needs. When it was decided, at
various points during the past thirty years, that law students
needed exposure to the laws relating to taxation and administra-
tive law and, labor law, courses bearing those titles were added
to the curriculum. It is a different question whether similar ac-
tion is to be taken upon the determination that lawyers need a
[Vol. 11
WAYS AND MEANS
fuller appreciation of the nature of their profession and the obli-
gations upon it, or a better understanding of the legislative proc-
ess, or greater facility in oral and written expression.
If I were asked to identify the essential qualities in a lawyer
there would be a temptation to reply that they are common sense,
imagination, and a sense of common, human decency. No one
would suggest, however, that we offer courses in Horse-Sense,
or in Imaginative Thought or in Doing Unto Others. Nor is
the principle necessarily different when we break these qualities
down into some of their elements or when we describe them
polysyllabically. It may very well be a mistake, once we have
isolated certain new things the law student needs, to try to teach
them apart from some of the traditional informational subject
matter nuclei. It may prove difficult to explore the second and
the third dimensions separately and apart from the first.
Professor Jones has referred to the advisability of setting our
instruction in a context of "lawyer situations." Taking, for ex-
ample, the matter of legal ethics, there is the consideration that
when a lawyer encounters a problem of ethics it will invariably
be in connection with his handling of a particular subject mat-
ter. Is it more effective to arrange a lecture on the iniquities
of champerty, or to take occasion to consider at various points
in perhaps every course the justification of counsel's having
brought particular cases to the courts? Is there a better way to
protest against professional bias in favor of the status quo than
to develop, in the Labor Law course, the nature of the Norris-
La Guardia Act as a reprimand, by the body politic, of the un-
conscionable collaboration between bench and bar in the use of
the injunction? The fullest understanding of the legislative proc-
ess would seem most likely to develop from adequate treatment
of the legislative aspects of every field of the law the student
considers rather than from a study of "a process" as such.
It is not to be disregarded that students come to the law
school already used to courses built around a grouping of infor-
mational content. Perhaps this means that they will seek only
this particular content in any course offered them in orthodox
outline and that they will pay no attention to the interlarding.
The alternative danger is that if a course is presented along en-
tirely unfamiliar lines, with no familiar type of skeleton discern-
ible, that they will conclude that there is nothing there at all.
The recent decision in a number of law schools to include a
course in Legal Writing brings into focus both the question of
whether the law school should try to develop all legal talents
and that of whether those which it does decide to emphasize
should be the subject of special courses. No one would question
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the essentiality of effective writing as a lawyer skill. Yet some-
thing more would appear necessary to establish the wisdom of
the law schools' offering courses in composition. Is effective writ-
ing more important to the lawyer than effective speaking? Are
we also to include courses in public speaking, and in money and
banking, and in American history?
It is no sufficient answer to say that if we don't give these
students practice in writing they simply won't get it. Why not,
if we find them deficient in this respect, send them over to the
proper departments in the college and require them to do this
work there? Or why not give them a law school entrance ex-
amination in composition, and deny them admission if they fail
to measure up? There is undeniably a type of thing which we
alone are in a position to offer, and we have only limited time
in which to offer it. It is agreed that tbis is a broader type of
thing than we have traditionally thought. But the boundaries
are only being revised, not destroyed. Unless it can be shown
that we are better writing teachers than our colleagues who are
trained in that field, our offering courses in writing doesn't make
sense. The miasmal prose of most legal documents and the obfus-
cation of too many leading articles in the law reviews leaves
obvious room for question as to our superior editorial capacities.
Reliance is sometimes placed on the argument that it is legal
writing we are going to teach. Is legal writing essentially differ-
ent from other writing, or is it only its corruption that has made
it appear so? Perhaps there are opportunities to so integrate a
writing course with certain subject matters that no precious time
is lost and some net gain is realized. The University of Chicago
faculty reports substantial accomplishment along these lines. Yet
this has apparently proved an almost herculean task and one
which most of us will probably be unable to perform. Already
those schools which are trying out this legal writing idea are
experiencing great difficulty in getting teaching fellows and fac-
ulty assistants to take over this arduous job. It may well be one
of the "bugs" involved here that comparatively few men will be
willing to devote the required time and energy to the develop-
ment of subjects which permit no direct contribution to some
recognized area of the law, as an incident of their pedagogical
endeavors. I am frank to confess my personal adherence to the
institution of a Legal Writing course at my own school. Equal
candor prompts, however, the recognition of the possible reflec-
tion here of the fallacy that the identification of a legal talent
in itself warrants the setting up of a new separate course in the
law school devoted exclusively, or at least primarily, to develop-
ing that talent.
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None of what has been said will be properly interpreted as
calling into question the desirability of integrating the law school
curriculum with the conclusions which may be reached as to
what are the capacities of the good lawyer. All who are familiar
with the recent report of the Curriculum Committee of the Col-
lege of Law here at The Ohio State University must be impressed
with the job which has been done of preparing a chart of spe-
cific obligations, so that the instructors handling certain specified
courses are charged with emphasizing matters which it has be-
come the general habit for everyone to leave up to someone else.
This report represents the most significant advance I have seen
in this whole field, leaving me entirely willing to accept the ob-
vious judgment of our Pennsylvania Railroad engineer last night
that it was coal he was carrying, with Newcastle the point of
consignment. This report, along with one or two others appear-
ing in the past three years, makes it clear that it is possible to
assume that not all law school faculty members consider them-
selves as the holders of vested interests in courses whose metes
and bounds are sacrosanct.
Yet it may still be questioned, in general, whether the imple-
mentation of the various proposals for reorienting legal education
are properly considered primarily a matter of curricular revision
or properly made the subject of the exclusive jurisdiction of fac-
ulty committees charged with responsibility only for developing a
line-up of law school courses. The problem is obviously broader
than that, and the attempts to meet it by curricular manipulation
are likely to be self-defeating. Part of the answer would seem to
lie in requiring the student to fill in some of his gaps by work out-
side of the law school. Part of it may well be the development
of programs of post-graduate education, sponsored perhaps by lo-
cal bar committees with a nearby law school faculty helping out
where it can. If the best way to emphasize the legislative proc-
ess, or the adjudicative process, is by a change in the way a
number of courses are presented, then it will be a mistake to
include a new course in the curriculum just because the com-
mittee in charge happens to have authority to recommend new
courses but none to change the habits of individual instructors.
That there has been a dietary deficiency here is relatively obvi-
ous, but it is not entirely clear whether the need is for new foods
or, rather, for fresher vegetables instead of the canned variety.
Perhaps our problem is that of continuing to serve bread, but
with the wheat germ restored.
Let's assume, now, that we have, after due consideration of
all the factors involved, decided upon certain second and third di-
mensional additions to our course of study. There is to be a new
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
course in Legal Writing, and another, despite the objections of
some, in Legislation; particular emphasis is to be placed in cer-
tain of the traditional courses upon the broader obligations of the
legal profession, and in some of the others a substantial amount
of time is to be devoted to training in specified skills and to a
consideration of certain "value" standards. Our next job will be
to see to it that what is already something of an anomaly in our
system does not become, as we seek to establish a new set of
pedagogical emphases, a destroying weakness. I refer to our ex-
amination system.
It is a fair guess that the written examinations we have been
giving have, more than anything else, resulted in a student em-
phasis on informational content which in theory we have for some
time protested. There can be no question, moreover, but that the
nature of almost all state bar examinations has not only made
this emphasis on the part of the students virtually inevitable, but
has to some extent made our own instructional efforts a continu-
al compromise between what we think we ought to teach and
what we know our students have to have to "pass the bar."
This problem is manifestly going to be worsened if we decide
now upon a greater emphasis on such things as values, insights,
processes and skills. It is obviously easier to examine a student
on his superficial mastery of a body of information than it is up-
on his development of facileness and upon his real understand-
ing of certain values, ethical standards, and processes. Yet if our
examinations, and the bar examiners', fail to make a display of
such facileness and understanding a condition of passing a course
we may as well recognize that our efforts in these directions will
have virtually no effect upon the lower ninety percent of our
students. This is the point at which we have to decide whether
what we are proposing is rugged training in these new qualities,
or only an exposure to them which will benefit almost exclusive-
ly those superior students who need it least, if at all. Are we
willing to say to Mr. Mediocrity after we have read his paper in
Contracts, or at the end of his three years: "Yes, you know the
cases and the rules well enough to pass the bar exam and to
practice law, but your paper makes it plain that you have no
sense of professional obligation, that your sense of values is still
at a high school level and that any document you draft will be
more likely than not to end up in litigation; therefore, we are
failing you?" Unless the answer to this question is "yes", we
had better proceed in this matter recognizing that our effective-
ness will remain at approximately a missionary level
Yet even if the answer to this question is not "yes", and that
is probably the case, there are obviously some things we can do
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to fit even our anachronistic examination system to the new de-
mands. One or two questions on each examination can be plain-
ly phrased to evoke value judgments. We can require the sub-
mission of written work which will reveal at least the extreme
cases of ineptitude in the skills of persuasion and expression.
Some form of oral examination can be devised to determine quali-
ties and capacities no written examination will ever reveal. Re-
cent experience in Pennsylvania and New Jersey indicates that
the bar examiner's attitude is not invariably adamantine, and that
these boards may be expected to go somewhat beyond the test-
ing of the applicant's ability to memorize black letter type. Last
year's Iowa bar examination is reported to have included three
exercises in statutory draftsmanship.
The answers here are far from clear, but the problem is ob-
vious. This new emphasis and these new courses are going to be
only gestures unless we gear our examination system in with the
purpose we seek to accomplish by it. Unless we express the
courage of our new convictions to the extent of "testing" in this
area as rigorously as we do in the informational area, Mr. M.
is not going to pay much attention to our inspirational efforts.
Should we find ourselves tempted to dismiss this problem on the
ground that the examination system doesn't make sense; anyway,
let's be honest enough to recognize that such an attitude is only
rationalization so long as we go on using this system to cover
most of what we teach. If this year's examination in what is
offered as a "three-dimensional" course is confined to problems
in case analysis, it is case analysis and not legal institutions or
the adjudicative process or legal ethics in which most of next
year's students in that course will prepare themselves.
Turning now to the matter of teaching materials, let's recog-
nize that we will only be fooling ourselves so long as we try
to teach a three-dimensional course from an old one-dimensional
case book. Most of us lack the forensic art of persuading stu-
dents that something is important even though there is nothing
whatsoever about it in the book. The common assumption is, of
course, that all printing presses are set up on the slopes of Mt.
Sinai, and that the true doctrine is dispersed only through this
medium. A good many students are possessed of better visual
than auditory perceptiveness, and it is in any event "the book"
which is reviewed as the semester goes on. Most student notes
on the classroom discussions are poor and it is only in the rare
case that our extempores are effectively designed to make a last-
ing impression.
The more important point here, however, is that unless we
go through the painstaking, stimulating process of working up
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new sets of materials, we are never really going to develop any-
thing more than relatively ineffective collections of class-room
footnotes reflecting the general, but only the general, orientation
we have in mind. Our own experience at Northwestern with
what seems to us the very worthwhile attempt to integrate groups
of related courses has thus far been disappointing because of the
seeming impossibility of working up the new materials which the
program envisages and requires for its full implementation. There
is the further consideration that no amount of broad thinking by
the policy committee or by the local curriculum committees is
going to prove the feasibility or practicability of a new or a
substantially revised course. Nor will that test be properly made
by trying the new course out if materials prepared for a differ-
ent course are used. The only process for making that determi-
nation is the process, involving preferably the participation of
several people, which is gone through when there is the challenge
of actually building the materials for a new course.
It is perhaps worth noting, too, that these innovations prob-
ably have as one of their necessary consequences a substantial
diminution in the present practice of wide usage of one or two
casebooks in each field. It may be assumed that a given book
will be relatively satisfactory for use wherever the course in Torts
is taught so long as it is the rules of Torts, the informational
content, which is stressed. But in the Ohio Committee's report,
the Torts course is to be the one in which an insight into Legal
Institutions is to be provided, the objective being "to afford an
awareness of the institutional pattern of legal systems; to impart
a grasp of law's basic institutions in their evolutional context;
to instil an appreciation of law as a learned profession and of its
basic traditions." It is a fair assumption that whoever teaches
a Torts course specially designed to emphasize the growth and
significance of legal institutions will have to prepare a special
set of teaching materials. Now suppose it is decided at the Uni-
versity of Cincinnati that there should be special emphasis upon
Legal Institutions, but that it should be in the Contracts Course;
and then at Western Reserve the decision is to do this job in the
Procedure course, and to use the Torts course as the place to
develop what the Ohio State Committee identifies (in connection
with another course) as insight into Legal Method, rather than
Legal Institutions. The decision in each case will probably re-
flect primarily the interests and capacities of particular members
of these faculties who will be teaching these courses. Yet it
would seem clear that different materials would have to be used
for each of these courses at each of the three schools. It is too
obvious to justify belaboring it that the payment of anything
[Vol. 11
WAYS AND MEANS
more than lip service to these principles of enriching our courses
of study is going to require that a lot more time be spent on the
preparation of specialized, and perhaps localized, teaching mater-
ials.
There is at least some justification for suggesting that it should
be adopted as a working rule that no faculty member will be ex-
pected to teach one of these vitamin-added courses unless he is
given a full semester, free of other teaching duties, to prepare spec-
ial materials, with a full-time secretary to assist him in the neces-
sary paper work. It will only kill these plans, full of merit as they
are, if an attempt is made to carry them out before arrangements
are made which will permit something more than improvisation
in the preparation of teaching materials. We are notoriously iden-
tified as a group of dreamers. This is at least in part because aca-
demic administration fails to take account of the practical neces-
sities which are essential to the making of dreams into realities.
A corporation will put a scientist with a promising formula off in
his laboratory for years just in the hope that he may be able to
prove out his hypothesis. The ideas teachers have must be devel-
oped in their spare time, most of which will have to go to the han-
dling of details which would, under any business-like system, be
handled for them.
Just a brief word about the use of the "problem method," ap-
parently already widely accepted as part of this evolution in law
school teaching methods. The assumption is apparently being made
rather generally that some courses rather than others should be
problem courses. "In the third year," the Ohio State Committee
reports, "the student should be ready for training in solving legal
problems." It is then proposed that the third year courses should
be presented on the problem-method basis. I wonder whether there
isn't justification for thinking rather of certain parts of various,
possibly even all, courses as being perhaps benefited from at least
experimental use of these problems. Most courses would seem
likely to include certain portions where straight textual treatment
would prove most economical and effective, others where a tradi-
tional pattern of appellate court opinions would best serve the
pedagogical purpose, and then still others where a set of "prob-
lems" would be most stimulating. It may well be a mistake to
develop our thinking about this new technique in terms of apply-
ing it either as an exclusive technique in a particular course, or
not, in that course, at all.
Finally, in what is at most only an illustrative listing of the
problems this new approach presents, is the question of whether
the type of course now contemplated can be effectively presented
to classes as large as those now characteristic of most law schools.
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A good many of us think we have been trying to teach something
more than straight informational subject matter for some time now.
Perhaps there is something beyond rationalization in the feeling
that one of the difficulties in doing so has proved to be the im-
possibility of broadcasting on 150 or 200 wave lengths at the same
time.
The "socratic" technique which is the hallmark of the law
teacher had its identified origin in the conversations the philosopher
held with his students as he sat with them at the foot of one of the
arches or in the gardens in Athens. Those groups were small;
Plato's dialogues reflect the conversations of a group of intimates.
Most of them had similar interests and probably substantial equal
intellectual capacity and background for these discussions. The
circumstances were such that it may be assumed that all followed
the discussion closely, each being free to break in if the point being
made started to float out of the realm of his comprehension. There
are few today who would quarrel about the efficacy, under those
conditions, of the teacher's asking questions instead of "laying out"
the information he thinks he has.
We have all sat in large law school classrooms where for at
least a few minutes a master teacher carried a small host of students
along with him in brilliant and illuminating "socratic" discourse
which stimulated even the thinking of those who did not partici-
pate vocally in the conversation. But invariably then, and before
long, the questioning shifted to someone less prepared for it than
most of the others, or perhaps to someone else so much better
prepared that few could adequately comprehend what followed.
Most of the listeners' thinking stopped, and they settled back to
await the master's denouement. If, in the full exercise of his
technique, he disappointed .them, a few would make a note to
get the answer someplace else, perhaps in their own subsequent
thinking; but in most notebooks a blank line or two would be
left, never to be filled in.
It is not, I think, an exaggeration to suggest that the majority
of students in our classrooms today find real stimulation in probably
no more than 25% of the discussion in the classroom. The rest of
it is with fellow students whose capacities are either so much
greater or so much less that the teacher's talk with those others
misses the broader mark. It takes better admissions policies than
most law schools have developed to provide a sufficiently homo-
geneous group that discussions with any one of the 200 students
will be very meaningful to most of the others. The theoretical al-
ternative of finding teachers who can, with infinitely delicate per-
ception, keep the discussion at that level where the largest num-
ber will at all times gain the most from it, is not a very real one -
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except as Plato attributed reality to ideals which exist only as
philosophical concepts.
This problem is acute enough when it is solely or primarily in-
formation we are seeking to impart or to develop as a nucleus for
independent student thinking. It becomes infinitely harder as we
start, or intensify, an exploration of values or an attempt at incul-
cating skills. The differences between each of 200 men in their
standards of values and in their facileness are undoubtedly far
greater than the differences in their background and capacities for
digesting information. I doubt very much whether either values or
skills can be learned except by full-time participation by every
student in the instructional process. Values are intimate, delicate
things and not something which can be passed from teacher to
student in wholesale fashion. I think I can at least make a student
see some justification for the values I think I hold if I have an
opportunity to learn what standards he already thinks he has.
Without that knowledge I expect only to ingrain his predilections
more deeply by expressing a seemingly different point of view,
never realizing the need for pointing out the little arch which could
so easily bridge the seeming chasm between us. As for skills, there
seems little question but that, even recognizing Professor Cavers'
wise distinction between skills and skillfulness, they must be learned
by doing, and not by watching or listening.
To whatever extent there may be substance in this suggestion
that the size of the class units affects the effectiveness of our teach-
ing, it means that the implementation of these new plans will neces-
sitate some changes in our present concepts of a workable faculty-
student ratio. Using round figures, and loose descriptive terms, a
limit of 50 to 75 students in the "informational" course taught pri-
marily on the casebook method would seem to me essential, with no
more than 30 or 40 students in the courses where a problem-method
approach will be followed to a substantial degree, and perhaps only
15 or 20 students in those courses (such as Legal Writing) where
a substantial degree of actual practice or doing is required. This
means, if my arithmetic is correct, a ratio of one faculty member to
about 20 students, or one to 25 or 30 if it can be assumed that some
increase could be made in what is today generally considered a
normal teaching "load" for an instructor. It is to be noted that the
Law School Association last year declined to set a maximum ratio
of 50 students to one faculty member, so that the accepted ratio
remains today a forbidding 100 to one. Long live the law school
factories, with their assembly lines!
There is time here only to note very briefly the possible ways
of meeting this smaller teaching unit problem. One is to increase
the size of the law school faculties. The economics of such a sugges-
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tion are not so formidable as they seem if special consideration is
given the possibilities of an expanded use of teaching-fellows and
part-time teachers from the local bar. There is also the possibility
of restricting our curricula very largely to required courses. Final-
ly, there is the possibility of our developing admissions programs
which will reduce substantially the present wastage in faculty and
student man hours and years which results in every case in which
a man is failed.
If it be suggested that any program of reducing student-faculty
ratios is impractical in that it disregards established university ad-
ministration attitudes, this simply illustrates again how broadly this
whole problem must be approached. The medical schools have
managed, some way, to correct these attitudes. What a job we
could do if we could persuade the powers that be to invest as much
in each law student as they do in each medical student! Is there a
basic difference? Or is it only that the world's social needs are so
much less tangible than people's demands for physiological minis-
tration? Is the obligation of the university to society in the various
fields measured by the spectacular and tangible quality of the re-
search feats which can be performed by the different faculty units?
If the trouble with these questions is that they ignore the
crasser facts of university administration, involving institutional
survival, then let's move down a level and talk plain dollars and
cents. The support of private institutions undoubtedly comes in
large measure from the alumni of the graduate schools, with the
law school graduates bearing substantially more than their pro
rata share. If the records should reveal this assumption as false,
the fact remains that it could be made to be true, for on an ability-
to-contribute basis the lawyers stand high. Is it not a reasonable
assumption that a law student who graduates from a school where
he was treated as an individual will be infinitely more anxious to
make a tangible contribution to the maintenance of that institution
than will one who was never permitted to emerge from the anony-
mous status of a seat number? There are reasonable grounds for
believing that it would take no more than ten years to amortize
fully the added expense of allocating 5% of a law school faculty
member's time to each of 20 students instead of 2% to each of 50
or 1% to each of 100. That there are parallel considerations in the
case of state supported universities may be adequately suggested
by simply noting the fact that the majority of state legislators, in-
cluding the membership of the educational and appropriation com-
mittees, are law school graduates.
This is unpleasant talk. But the unpleasant fact is that all of
our planning for a fuller and richer system of legal education is
likely to prove sterile unless we can in some way arrange for the
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individualization of the student-teacher relationship which it de-
mands. It must be part of this project to enlist the necessary sup-
port of those charged with administrative responsibility, either
upon the basis of the interests of society in this project or upon the
basis of a narrower conception of the interests of the university.
These have been random remarks, and too much in the nature
of a cataloguing of the obvious. Perhaps it is a mistake to emphasize
and possibly even exaggerate the mechanical difficulties of effect-
uating programs of revised pedagogy which hold so much of promise
as do those now at the blue print stage in many of the country's law
schools. It would be perhaps the more realistic approach to recog-
nize that they cannot be expected to materialize in their projected
form, but that substantial gains will be realized from thinking our
job through more clearly and in our reaching even for what we can-
not grasp.
There is at the same time no good reason for ignoring the de-
mands which our architectual accomplishments place upon us now
as carpenters and plumbers. There is a great deal we can do, re-
gardless of difficulties and even restrictions, if we recognize our
purpose as being not to revise curricula and rewrite "course-books,"
but to increase the stature of the men and women who come to us
as students, to treat them as individuals rather than as receptacles.
How pleasant it will be if, in this process, we discover that the
teacher, too, grows more in the role of counsellor to friends than in
that of oracle to audience.
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